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Successorship and Collective Bargaining




Mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets are important and
frequent business transactions in our economy' and involve a great deal
of planning and negotiating by the enterprises concerned. Until recently,
the rights of employees and their representative labor unions generally
were not considered to be a factor in these plans. In 1964, however,
the Supreme Court, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,2 held that
common law privity-of-contract principles, which lower courts
traditionally had invoked to preclude survival of employees' rights, did
not necessarily apply to collective bargaining agreements. Wiley was a
nonunion corporation that had merged with a smaller unionized firm
whose collective bargaining agreement contained a broad arbitration
clause.3 The Court required Wiley to arbitrate the extent to which the
agreement governed its responsibilities to the smaller company's
employees whom Wiley had hired. This decision was soon extended by
lower federal courts to situations involving purchases of assets., The
* Field Attorney, Region 4, National Labor Relations Board. B.A. 1965, Haverford College;
LL.B. 1968, Columbia University.
The views expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of the National Labor
Relations Board or of the General Counsel.
I. 1,230 mergers involving the exchange of at least $700,000 in cash or securities for the
assets or stock of another domestic corporation were completed in 1970. This figure does not
include the acquisitions of subsidiaries or divisions of other companies, which would raise the total
by as much as 25%. The figure also represents a 28% decline from the 1,712 similar transactions
in 1969 and a 33% drop from 1968's boom of 1,829. This decline, however, appears to have been
caused by the general state of the economy rather than by a growing disdain for mergers. It may
be noted that of the 12 largest mergers during the year, 6 involved more than $100 million while
none was below the $50 million mark. Mergers & Acquisitions, Press Release, Dec. 31, 1970,
reproduced in part in The Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1971, at 33.
2. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). For a description of the legal developments that preceded Wiley
see Vernon, Business Combinations and Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 CATH. U. L. REv.
1, 2-4 (1969).
3. It covered "any difference, grievance or dispute between the Employer and the Union
arising out of or relating to this agreement, or its interpretation or application, or enforcement
." 376 U.S. at 533.
4. See United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964);
Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
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effect of Wiley and subsequent related cases has been to make the
obligations of employers vis-a-vis their employees a significant
consideration in planning business combinations and purchases. This
article will examine the uncertain status of a new employer's obligation
to his employees after a change in business ownership and will analyze
the impact that recent decisions will have on these important
transactions.
II. THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT OF SUCCESSORSHIP
The key factor in Wiley and related cases that determined if
employee rights would survive was whether the purchasing or resulting
business was classified as a "successor" employer, a status that results
when "there is substantial continuity in the employing enterprise"5
despite the change in ownership.6 Since 1964, some uncertainty about
the breadth of the Wiley decision has been eliminated by requiring
successors7 to go so far as to correct their predecessors' unfair labor
practices;" in addition, the duty to bargain with the unions representing
employees retained from the prior work force has been expanded A
significant question that remained, however, was the extent that
predecessors' labor agreements survived to bind successors. The Ninth
Circuit, in Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers,"0
concluded that Wiley required a successor be bound by a prior contract
in its entirety, limited only by an artibrator's interpretation of its specific
terms and the application of them to particular circumstances and
events. Until recently, however, no other court has agreed with this
assertion," despite the argument that it-was anomalous to hold that an
5. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964); Michaud
Bus Lines, Inc., 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,583; Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 496, 499
(1965).
6. This general principle is not necessarily easy to apply to particular situations, even with
established criteria of successorship. See notes 58-74 infra and accompanying text.
7. Successor questions generally reach the courts through suits under § 301(a) of the Taft-
Hartley amendments (Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tit. 1II, 61 Stat. 156, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1964)) to the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA). This section gives federal
courts jurisdiction over suits that involve violations of labor contracts. Successor questions were
considered by the NLRB pursuant to § 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charges (LMRA § 8(a)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964)). See Vernon, supra note 2, at 6-7 n.32.
8. Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967).
9. Even if the predecessor's contract expires, the successor may not unilaterally discontinue
carrying out its terms. Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 838 (1967). See also Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).
10. 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
11. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964);
Retail Store Employees Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
But see Ranch-way, Inc. v. NLRB, 77 L.R.R.M. 2689 (10th Cir. June 24, 1971).
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arbitration clause survived a change of ownership, but that other
contractual terms did not. 2 The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), which had avoided the issue for several years, 3 finally faced
it squarely in May 1970 in William J. Burns International Detective
Agency, Inc. '
4
A. The Board's Decision Establishing the Burns Doctrine
In Burns, the Burns Agency replaced Wackenhut Corporation as
the supplier of security guards at a California industrial facility. At the
time of replacement, only two months of a three-year collective
bargaining agreement between Wackenhut and the United Plant Guard
Workers Local No. 162 had elapsed. Although aware of the
representative status of the union, Burns retained 27 union men, and,
in conjunction with fifteen of its own guards from other plants, began
performing the same security services that Wackenhut had performed.
When Burns thereafter rejected the Union's requests for recognition of
and adherence to the contract in question, the NLRB issued a refusal-
to-bargain complaint.
The Board concurred with the Trial Examiner's determination that
Burns satisfied the successor employer test.of "substantial continuity,"''
5
because ex-Wackenhut employees constituted the majority of its work
force and the nature of the business remained the same. The Board also
noted that Wiley imposed a duty on successors to recognize and bargain
with a predecessor's employees' union,'6 and asserted that this policy
protects "the employees' exercise of the right to engage in collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing . . . [and]
12. See, e.g., Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Relations, 19 N.Y.U.
CON. LAB. 357, 369-70 (1967); Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate: A
Reconsideration of John Wiley & Sons. Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 418,422 (1968).
13. See Vernon, supra note 2, at 13-14.
14. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,082. For a discussion of the dissent see note 20 infra. There
were 3 companion cases decided with Burns: Kota Division of Dura Corp., 1970 CCH NLRB
Dec. 28,088 (Member Jenkins dissenting); Travelodge Corp., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,086; and
Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,089. Hackney, however, was the only case
that involved a situation similar to that in Burns. In Travelodge, by the time the successorship
question was raised, only a small number of the original employees remained and the building
had undergone substantial remodeling and expansion. The Board held, under these circumstances,
that the refusal of the management to adhere to the union contract was justified. In Kota the
Board held, under the rationale of Burns, that a successor could insist that the union adhere to
the contract negotiated with the predecessor employer. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. at 28,089. This
decision may avoid problems for the unions concerned, since their memberships will not be able
to demand that they immediately negotiate for higher wages and benefits. But cf. note 74 infra.
15. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. at 28,083.
16. See NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939).
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further[s] the interests of industrial peace."' 7 The Board said:
[T]he obligation to bargain imposed on a successor-employer includes the negative
injunction to refrain from unilaterally changing wages and other benefits established
by a prior collective-bargaining agreement even though that agreement has expired
*.... In this respect, the successor-employer's obligations are the same as those
imposed upon employers generally during the period between collective-bargaining
agreements.18
The issue presented, therefore, was whether these principles could be
extended to require a successor to assume his predecessor's entire labor
contract. Emphasizing that the objective of collective bargaining was
the fostering of industrial peace based on mutually approved contract
terms and acknowledging that unilateral mid-term contract
modifications were proscribed by section 8(d) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 9 the Board concluded that these considerations
outweighed the absence of privity and held that Burns was bound by
Wackenhut's collective bargaining agreement.2"
The 'Board defended its holding by stating that its ruling could not
be "equated with compelling Burns to agree to a bargaining proposal
or make a concession it is unwilling to make,' '2 because the collective
bargaining agreement was in force when Burns elected to assume
Wackenhut's service functions and to hire its employees. The Board also
maintained that there was no inequity in requiring a successor to assume
his predecessor's labor contract since the successor "stands in the shoes
of his predecessor [and] can make whatever adjustments the acceptance
of such obligation may dictate in his negotiations concerning the
17. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. at 28,084.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
20. There was one dissenting vote. Member Howard Jenkins, Jr. found no "clear statutory
command" in § 8(d) of the Act, which refers to a "party" to a contract and not a successor,
and no "binding judicial precedent" in Wiley, in which arbitration was required only with regard
to rights that had "vested" through past performance by the employees that would support
imposing an existing agreement on a successor employer. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. at 28,085-86.
Furthermore, Jenkins felt that the Board departed from the labor policy established by the Supreme
Court because the parties would have no flexibility in working out their new arrangements through
arbitration. This flexibility is particularly important for the survival of marginal or faltering
enterprises whose future depends on rearranging the terms and conditions of employment. "Thus,
to impose the agreement on the new relation may in many cases prove a source of friction and
disruption, rather than provide the stability for which my colleagues hope." Id. at 28,086.
It may be argued, however, that the difficulty which Burns may impose on faltering companies
searching for help does not outweigh the stability that the decision will provide in more fortunate
business combinations and purchases. Furthermore, it is not wholly inconceivable that a union
might agree with a successor to modify a contract that is a primary cause of the company's
economic difficulties.
21. Id.at28,085.
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takeover of the business, [while] employees cannot make a comparable
adjustment.
2
The NLRB, therefore, placed successors in precisely the same
contractual status as their predecessors had been with respect to their
employees and unions. A successor could no longer bargain with the
union until reaching an impasse and then simply implement its own
proposed terms and conditions as an employer could do if no contract
were extant.2 3 Burns required that, in the absence of "unusual
circumstances," the successor must assume the entire existing
agreement.24 A major issue of concern to both management and labor
arising out of changes in ownership, then, was apparently resolved. It
is anticipated, however, that efforts to circumvent it, as well as its
application to novel situations, will provide the Board and courts with
continuing problems in this area.25
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949). See also S-H Food
Serv., Inc., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,440.
24. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. at 28,084. It should be noted that assumption of a collective
bargaining agreement by a successor does not necessarily relieve the predecessor of all obligations
under it. Local 82, Packinghouse Workers v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 430 F.2d 70, 73
(7th Cir. 1970). See also General Motors Corp., 5 CCH'LAB. L. REP. 23,264 (July 8, 1971)
(concerns extent of a predecessor's obligation to bargain with respect to its decision to sell its
business and with respect to the decision's effect on unit employees).
25. Attempts to circumvent Burns have been successful in the Second Circuit, where Burns
itself has been reversed. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911
(2d Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the reversal see notes 40-51 infra and accompanying text. It,
however, is NLRB policy to follow its own precedents until directed by the Supreme Court to
do otherwise. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), rev'don other grounds,
260 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
It is anticipated that there will be numerous efforts to obtain the overruling of the Board's
Burns doctrine from the Board itself which includes 2 new members in addition to Member Jenkins
who dissented in Burns. These efforts, however, will probably be fruitless, despite the fact that
the 2 new members, Edward B. Miller and Ralph Kennedy, are seen as bringing a new conservatism
to the Board which is often equated by critics with a promanagement philosophy. Chairman Miller,
furthermore, appears to require stricter standards of proof of employers' illegal conduct and
interference with employees' protected activities in § 8(a)(l) cases and to demand a higher degree
of proof of discriminatory intent in § 8(a)(3) cases than has the Board previously. For an example
of Chairman Miller's philosophy see his dissenting opinions in National Tape Corp., 5 CCH LAB.
L. REP. 9- 22,565 (Dec. 17, 1970) (he maintained, contrary to the majority, that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant findings of unlawful layoff and discharge of 6 workers); Texas
Transp. & Terminal Co., 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 22,588 (Dec. 24, 1970) (his dissent argued that
there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding that the purpose of employer's wage increases
was to discourage union organization). The Chairman also has shown in 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain
questions, an apparent desire to allow the parties greater freedom in negotiating contracts. E.g.,
Moore of Bedford, Inc., 5 CCH LAB L. REP. 22,621 (Jan. 7, 1971) (Chairman Miller argued
that it is not illegal for an employer to unilaterally figure piece-work rates subject to a grievance
procedure, so long as the rates are not purposely calculated to effectively eliminate piece:rate
disputes from arbitration).
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B. Post Burns Decisions
The Burns doctrine has been clarified in several subsequent Board
cases. In S-H Food Service, Inc.,26 for example, the Board decided that
Burns required a successor to adhere to all terms of an existing labor
agreement and not just to implement the contract "in many important
respects." This decision, however, was not unexpected in light of the
Burns doctrine on assumption of a predecessor's agreement. A further
consequence of Burns has been that a successor, like the original
employer,28 may not challenge a union's majority status during the term
of a contract, 2 except for the 60- to 90-day period prior to the expiration
of the contract, during which time representation petitions may be
filed.30 Consequently, a successor has been ordered to adhere to an
agreement outstanding even when, following the change in ownership,
"no employee tendered dues to the Union . . . . no meetings of the
local were held,. . . , membership in the Union had been required by
the contiact . . . , 90 percent of the employees had told [the president
of the local] that they were no longer interested in the Union," and
the new employer reasonably believed that the union was no longer a
majority representative.3' Once the contract has expired, of course, the
new employer may overcome "the presumption of majority arising from
[the] history of collective bargaining [and the pre-existing contract, by
objectively demonstrating] that it has some reasonable grounds for
believing that the union has lost its majority status.
'3 2
The Chairman, however, is "in basic agreement with the Burns decision, and believe[s] that
the certainty afforded thereby is a wholesome aid to that kind of industrial relations stability which
is one of the key objectives of the law." Address by NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller, Labor
Law Conference, Louisiana State University, Jan. 22, 1971, in 76 LAB. REL. REP. 89, 91 (1971).
He noted that reaction to the decision is probably mixed among private parties. Some individuals
from both management and labor feel that Burns provides employers with certainty of their
obligations to employees and gives employees security, but others in both camps would prefer to
be left free to arrive at their own arrangements through negotiation and not be bound by an existing
agreement. Compare Bernstein, Labor Problems on Acquisitions and Sale of Assets, 22 N.Y.U.
CONF. LAB. 81 (1970), with Abodeely, The Effect of Reorganization, Merger or Acquisition on
the Appropriate Bargaining Unit, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 488 (1971); Spelfogel, Labor Liabilities
in Purchases, Acquisitions and Mergers, 21 LAB. L.J. 577 (1970).
26. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,440.
27. Id. at 28,441.
28. Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963); Hexton Furniture Co., Ill
N.L.R.B. 342 (1955).
29. Ranch-Way, Inc., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,433.
30. Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958), modified, Leonard Wholesale
Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
31. Ranch-Way, Inc., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,433.
32. Barrington Plaza, 75 L.R.R.M. 1226, 1230 (Oct. 12, 1970); accord, United States
Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966).
SUCCESSORSHIP AND BARGAINING
Burns also has been held applicable to the take-over of a firm that
has signed a multi-employer contract. In Solomon Johnsky, 3 the
predecessor employer owned four stores in one area and had negotiated
a labor contract with the union that represented the employees of all
these establishments. The buyer of one of these four stores learned of
the contract during the purchase negotiations and, despite his opposition
to the union, was required to assume this contract. Since the contract
recognized the separate identity of each store, the Board disagreed with
the Trial Examiner's conclusion that a separate single-store unit was
inappropriate and found no "administrative impediment to the
application of the basic contract terms dealing with wages, hours, and
conditions of employment to the employees in that unit."3 4 Similarly,
when the predecessor employer had belonged to a multi-employer
association that traditionally negotiated contracts for all association
members, and when it had refused to sign the contract resulting from
the most recent negotiations, the successor was ordered to remedy this
unfair labor practice by executing the negotiated agreement and by
reimbursing the employees who had suffered financially3 from the
refusal to abide by its terms .3
Burns should not be construed as having commanded absolute
adherence to predecessors' contracts. Successors still may make
agreements with their unions to alter terms,3 7 may challenge the
continuing majority status of a construction industry union under a
collective bargaining agreement executed pursuant to section 8(f)(1) of
the LMRA'3 1 or, in extraordinary circumstances, even may avoid the
33. 74 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1970).
34. 74 L.R.R.M. at 1612.
35. Only those employees hired by the successor at the time of acquisition, and not those
hired afterwards, were eligible to receive monetary awards. Teamsters Local 171 v. NLRB, 425
F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970).
36. Compare Standard Plumbing & Heating Co., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,754, and
Solomon Johnsky, with Travelodge Corp., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,086 (finding that an employer
was not a successor was based, in part, on the absence of any offer to him to join his predecessor's
multi-employer bargaining association).
37. S-H Food Service, Inc., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,440.
38. LMRA § 8(0(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(0(1) (1964). This section provides: "It shall not be
an unfair labor practice. . . for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction
industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will
be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building
and construction employees are members . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor
organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the
making of such agreement. ... In Davenport Insulation, Inc., 74 L.R.R.M. 1726 (1970), the
Board said § 8(f)(1) "was intended to permit an. employer in the construction industry to negotiate
a contract with a union which has not established its majority status without either party running
the risk of committing an unfair labor practice. But when a collective-bargaining agreement is
1971]
910 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24
prior contracts altogether. 39 Successors generally, however, must follow
the mandate of the Burns decision and adhere to the responsibilities
imposed by their predecessors' agreements.
C. Burns Reversed
On April 26, 1971, the Second Circuit reversed the Board's decision
in Burns40 on the ground that the Supreme Court, in H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB,41 had ruled that specific contractual provisions could not be
imposed by the Board on any party to collective bargaining. The Wiley
case was distinguished because that successor was only ordered to fulfill
its predecessor's obligation to arbitrate and because the holding was
dictated by the paramount federal policy of encouraging arbitration. The
Second Circuit, however, reasoned that there were no similar overriding
policy considerations present in Burns. In addition, the importance of
creating certainty for parties to corporate sales and combinations was
deemed ft be insignificant when compared with the serious inequities
entered into pursuant to that section, the contract can give rise to no presumption of continuing
majority status. . . . [Thus,] since the contract with the predecessor employer has been entered
into pursuant to Section 8(f), no duty is imposed upon the successor employer to honor its
predecessor's bargaining obligation unless there is independent proof of the union's actual majority
and of the successor employer's refusal to bargain." Id. at 1727 (footnotes omitted).
39. See, e.g., Potter v. Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2119 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5,
1970). In Potter, a contractor with a one-year maintenance contract from the Air Force, although
realizing that he probably would not be able to extend his contract, entered a 3-year collective
bargaining agreement with the appropriate union. In exchange for favorable terms during the first
year, the employer agreed to onerous terms during the second and third years. In refusing to require
a successor to adhere to the contract, the court said: "If the succeeding contractor is obliged to
recognize and accept the Union and the terms of the contract made by the predecessor, it opens
the door for an agreement between the earlier contractor and the Union whereby that contractor
is able to secure favorable terms during the year of his tenure, the Union receiving its quid pro
quo in terms far more favorable (to the Union) to which any succeeding contractor will be required
to submit." Id. The court additionally noted that this could not be deemed "bona fide and arms'
length collective bargaining" on the part of the original contractor and stated that the case
presented "questions as to the binding effect of Burns [and] as to whether Emerald is a 'successor
employer' to the earlier contractor, [that] should await a full consideration by the Board and the
courts." Id. at 2120. See also the case discussed on pages 3-4 of General Counsel's Report on
Case-Handling Developments, 76 LAB. REL. REP. 105, 106 (1971).
The Board thereafter held, in considering the merits of the unfair labor practice charge, that
successful bidders on federal services contracts are not bound by the collective bargaining
agreements signed by prior employers performing the same work; these new employers, however,
must recognize and bargain with the union representing the predecessor's employees. Emerald
Maintenance, Inc., 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 22,817 (Mar. 5, 1971). Thus, the policy considerations
underlying Burns were not regarded as applicable in this situation. Coincidentally, the United States
Government Accounting Office ruled during the same week that the "successor-employer" doctrine
does not apply to support service contracts for government installations. See 76 LAB. REL. REP.
230 (1971).
40. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. 397 U.S.99 (1970).
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that might arise under the Board's holding; for example, a union that
had made concessions to a failing predecessor to prevent the employer's
bankruptcy would be bound to the same contract with an affluent
successor. Finally, the Board's holding that, in the absence of "unusual
circumstances," a successor would be bound to the predecessor's labor
contract42 was criticized because the Board thereby arrogated to itself
the power to select the contractual provisions to be imposed on
successors.
The Second Circuit's decision is subject to criticism on several
fronts. First, while H.K. Porter acknowledged the obligation of a
successor to recognize and bargain with the employees' representative
even without a new showing of the union's majority status, the Second
Circuit was unjustified in concluding that this was the extent of the
successor's duty and that the contract which had resulted from the
predecessor's recognition did not also continue. In H.K. Porter the
Supreme Court reversed an order of the Board requiring an employer
to include a dues checkoff provision in its contract with the union after
the employer had improperly refused to negotiate the issue. The Court
found that Congress had never intended the Board to "become a party
to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement.
'4 3
In Burns, however, before there was any government intervention, a
contract had been negotiated between the United Plant Guard Workers
and Burns's predecessor. Thus, in seeking observance of terms
previously agreed upon, the Board was not engaging in the interference
proscribed by H.K. Porter.44
Secondly, besides failing to distinguish the H.K. Porter case
properly, the Second Circuit also can be criticized for giving too narrow
an interpretation to Wiley. In that case, the Supreme Court did more
than recognize the importance of labor arbitration; it held that common-
law privity-of-contract principles did not automatically apply to
collective bargaining agreements. The Board legitimately relied on this
aspect of Wiley in reaching its decision in Burns, but the Second Circuit
appears to have reintroduced the privity concept.
42. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,082.
43. 397 U.S. at 103-04.
44. The Supreme Court in Wiley recognized the distinction between the precontract situation
of Porter and the midcontract situation of Burns. The Court stated that the precontract situation
in that case could not "readily be assimilated to the category of those in which there is no contract
whatever, or none which is reasonably related to the party sought to be obligated." John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). Nothing in Porter suggests that this has
now been changed. See also Tex Tan Welhausen Co. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
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Thirdly, the court's policy argument that the Board's decision
might prove inequitable to a union is not compelling. The Second Circuit
decision would be equally inequitable to a union if it had exacted a
favorable contract from an employer after hard bargaining and did not
have the resources to revive the struggle against a powerful successor.
Moreover, in deciding which decision is best from a policy viewpoint,
greater attention should be paid to the fact that numerous practitioners
were pleased with the certainty created in this area by the Board's
decision.4 5 Finally, although the Board's reservation of the power to
decide the "unusual circumstances" in which portions of the labor
contract will not outlast the succession is questionable, this weakness
in the Board's holding should not override its other positive features."
On June 24, 1971, the Board's Burns doctrine,47 that a successor
is bound by its predecessor's labor contract, was accepted by the Tenth
Circuit in Ranch-Way, Inc. v. NLR B.4 This conflict between the
circuits and the significance of the issue were probably the principal
reasons why the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since it is Board
policy to follow its own precedents until directed by the Supreme Court
to do otherwise," it will continue to apply its Burns doctrine, unless the
Court ultimately upholds the Second Circuit. Because the author feels
that the Court should uphold the Board's decision and anticipates that
it will,51 the remainder of the article will discuss the implications of the
Board's Burns doctrine.
45. Bernstein, Labor Problems on Acquisitions and Sale of Assets, 22 N.Y.U. CONF LAB.
81 (1970). But see Abodeely, The Effect of Reorganization, Merger or Acquisition on the
Appropriate Bargaining Unit, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 488 (1971); Spelfogel, Labor Liabilities
in Purchases, Acquisitions and Mergers, 21 LAB. L.J. 577 (1970).
46. In any event, this flaw in the Board's reasoning may be resolved by the reconsideration
of the concept of successorship that may be taking place. See note 66 infra.
47. In the remainder of this article, "Burns doctrine" will refer to the holding and rationale
of the Board's decision rather than that of the Second Circuit.
48. 77 L.R.R.M. 2689 (10th Cir., June 24, 1971). The Board held that the successor was
required to act in accordance with its predecessor's contract despite some question about the union's
continuing majority status. Ranch-Way, Inc., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,433, affid, 77 L.R.R.M.
2689 (10th Cir. June 24, 1971). Two other related Board decisions, Interstate 65 Corp., 1970 CCH
NLRB Dec. 28,927, and Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,087, are soon to be
reviewed by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits respectively.
49. 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (Nos. 71-123 &71-198).
50. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957).
51. It cannot be presumed that a more conservative Supreme Court than the one that decided
Wiley will necessarily reverse the Board in this instance. Chairman Miller's agreement with the
Board's decision shows that conservatism cannot be assumed to imply disagreement with Burns.
For a discussion of Chairman Miller's position see note 25 supra. The Supreme Court will likely
view the Board's decision as being consistent with established labor policies and as effecting
necessary stability in labor relations. See Vernon, supra note 2, at 16.
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D. Ramifications of Burns
Even though the Board in Burns and its companion cases has
established specific and comprehensive guidelines for successors and
their predecessors' unions, a number of questions remain: what further
issues may arise in this area; what will be the ramifications of these
decisions; and what kind of situations and litigation may be anticipated?
At the very least, these decisions should eliminate most section 301 (a)
52
suits to compel arbitration of existing contracts by successors;
additionally, they should provide a basis for refusal-to-bargain charges
under section 8(a)(5),5 for example, when the six-month statute of
limitations in section 10(b) of the LMRA 54 has passed.5 5 More
significantly, substantial efforts to avoid successorship status and
thereby circumvent the Burns doctrine can be anticipated. Finally,
questions will arise regarding the applicability of this doctrine to mergers
and consolidations.
III. AVOIDANCE OF SUCCESSORSHIP
There undoubtedly will be attempts to circumvent the Burns
doctrine by arranging business combinations so that the resulting
enterprises cannot be deemed to be successors .5  As noted previously,
a firm is considered to be a successor "where there is substantial
continuity in the identity of the employing enterprise ' 57 after a change
of ownership. This general criterion has had a few flourishes added to
it. The Board has stated that "the key test in determining whether a
change in the employing industry has occurred is whether it may
52. 20 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
54. Id. § 160(b).
55. For a comparison of the considerations involved in choosing between § 301 (a) suits and
§ 8(a)(5) charges prior to Burns see Vernon, supra note 2, at 6-7 n.32.
56. After announcing on June 11, 1971 that the Board would seek review of the Second
Circuit's decision in Burns, Chairman Miller noted a caveat: "Even if the Board's position is
sustained, there remain very difficult questions of whether the facts in any particular case are
sufficient to establish successorship." Address by Chairman Miller, Chairman of the NLRB,
reproduced in D.L.R. No. 115, June 15, 1971, E-1, E-4.
57. Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1965); see cases cited note 5 supra. See
also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,551 (1964); NLRBv. Valleydale Packers,
Inc., 402 F.2d 768, 769 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969); NLRB v. Auto




reasonably be assumed that, as a result of the transitional changes, the
employees' desires concerning unionization have likely changed."-", The
general standard, however, still looks to the similarity between the
businesses in question. Therefore, when the new employer is "using
substantially the same facilities and work force to produce the same
basic products for essentially the same customers in the same geographic
area," 59 successor status is found to exist."0 This concept is quite broad
and even a court-appointed receivership trustee has been held to be a
successor.61
Despite the breadth of its coverage, various efforts to avoid
successorship can be expected. Since retention of the prior work force
appears to be the most significant criterion of successorship, 2 new
employers may decide not to hire employees of the previous company.
A new employer has no affirmative duty to rehire these workers, 3 and
he may refuse to do so unless this action is shown to be prompted by
an antiunion motive. 4 Employers, therefore, probably will make greater
efforts to find acceptable reasons for not rehiring members of the old
work force if they want to avoid their predecessors' labor contract.
The importance of the employee-retention criterion in determining
successorship status appears to have arisen from an analysis of
employer-employee relationships and a desire to protect workers from
changing working conditions. 5 Thus, if an employer hired his
predecessor's workers, he was deemed to have assumed certain
obligations to them and their union. Various practitioners, however,
have contended that the type of business combination should be the
58. Ranch-Way, Inc., 74 L.R.R.M. 1389, 1391 (1970); see NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d
800 (7th Cir. 1952).
59. Ranch-Way, Inc., 74 L.R.R.M. 1389, 1391 (1970), citingJ. Howard Jenks, 1968-2 CCH
NLRB Dec. 25,261, and Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964).
60. For a more comprehensive description of the criteria of successorship see Vernon, supra
note 2, at 8-10.
61. See, e.g., Interstate 65 Corp., 186 L.R.R.M. 1403, 1405 (1970), citing Marion Simcox,
1969 CCH NLRB Dec. 27,097. But see Gladding Corp., 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. T 23,297 (July
22, 1971); Southland Mfg. Corp., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,044.
62. See, e.g., Barrington Plaza, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,858; Builder's Realty & Mortgage
Co., Inc., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,993; Tallakson Ford, Inc., 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,667;
Thomas Cadillac, Inc., 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,396.
63. Milton H. Kantor, 1969 CCH NLRB Dec. 26,829, citing Tri State Maintenance Corp.,
167 N.L.R.B. 933 (1967), affd as modified, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
64. See, e.g., Barrington Plaza, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,858; Milton H. Kantor, 1969
CCH NLRB Dec. 26,829. Burns has not abrogated the employer's right to refuse, for
nondiscriminatory reasons, to rehire his predecessor's work force, and it is not anticipated that
the Board will now attempt to do so. See Builders Realty & Mortgage Co., 1970 CCH NLRB
Dec. 28,993 (Trial Examiner's decision adopted by the Board).
65. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
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principal criterion for successorship, rather than the effect of the
corporate action on the workers. In a merger, for example, the surviving
corporation absorbs the liabilities as well as assets of a predecessor and
therefore should also assume the liability of an extant collective
bargaining agreement. In a Burns-type situation, however, where the
new employer does not purchase all of the prior employer's assets or
assume its liabilities, and where a third party such as Lockheed has the
power to determine which company will hire the workers and provide
services to it, successorship status should not be found. 6
Employers also may take aim at other successorship criteria. Thus,
they may attempt to make major changes in the operations and
organizational structure of their new enterprise" or may decide to break
up and destroy the identity of the collective bargaining unit so that it
is no longer appropriate." In addition, successors may choose to close
down the acquired enterprise for a length of time,69 remodel the
premises, 70 change job classifications, change the methods of production,
move the plant, interchange retained employees among departments, or
similarly interchange supervisors or hire new ones. 71 With the possible
66. In fact, Burns will make this argument before the Supreme Court. 40 U.S.L.W. 3162
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (Nos. 71-123 & 71-198). A recent Board case, Lincoln Private Police, Inc.,
5 CCH LAB. L. REP. ' 22,924 (Apr. 12, 1971) may demonstrate a new acceptance of this view. In
that case Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy joined Member Jenkins, who had previously
expressed a narrower view of successors than other members. See, e.g., Suffolk Mack, Inc., 74
L.R.R.M. 1666, 1668 (1970) (Member Jenkins, dissenting). They found that a new employer who
had taken over a substantial part of a prior employer's guard service business and a significant
majority of its employees was not a successor. They pointed out that the new employer had ac-
quired many of the prior employer's clients by means of independent solicitation and had obtained
30% of its clients from new sources. They also noted that various other employers also had acquired
clients and employees from the predecessor employer. Moreover, the new owner had obtained its
own operating capital, purchased new uniforms and equipment, occupied different premises, and
failed to purchase any of the defunct company's assets or hire any of the previous supervisory
personnel. Taken together, these factors were deemed to outweigh the fact that the new employer
continued substantial guard operations previously performed with some of the same employees.
Lincoln suggests that the Board may be reconsidering its concept of who is a successor. Those who
disagree with the Board's Burns doctrine are looking for some change in this respect during the
terms of the Board's new members.
67. Cf. NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970) (changes in internal
organization and centralization of personnel and purchasing held insufficient to avoid
successorship). See also NLRB v. DIT-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970) (acquisition and
reorganization of subsidiary not sufficient to escape successor status when most employees carried
over).
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159, 1166 (5th Cir. 1970) (particularly the
concluding sentence); Michaud Bus Lines, Inc., 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. 29,583; cf. NLRB v. Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co., 435 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchaser of one of 2 operations within a
single plant charged with violation of § 8(a)(5) by not bargaining with union that used to represent
workers from both operations). See also Travelodge Corp., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,086.
69. See, e.g., Retail Store Employees Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp.
655 (N.D. Ohio 1966); cf Builders Realty & Mortgage Co., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,993.
70. Cf Travelodge Corp., 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,086.
71. The range of possible actions is, of course, restricted by economic feasibility.
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exception of an outright refusal to employ the prior work force, 72 it is
expected that no single tactic will be sufficient to avoid successorship;
however, several in conjunction may do so.
IV. MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS
Litigation also can be expected when the extension of the Burns
doctrine to mergers and consolidations is considered.7 3 If the units of
the original employers are maintained separately and distinctly in the
new enterprise, Burns would appear to require the surviving employer
to assume all labor agreements covering the separate units. 74 If the work
forces are fully integrated, however, and the bargaining units are not
so fragmented as to preclude successorship, 75 more complex problems
arise.
When the two employee units to be integrated are unequal in size,
aind the smaller unit is organized but the larger is not, a Wiley situation
is presented, and the employer's obligations should be limited to
arbitration of the retained employees' rights that vested during the prior
employment. If the larger unit is union-represented, then the smaller
group, whether organized or not, will probably be deemed an accretion
to the other,7 and the employer, under Burns, necessarily will be bound
72. If an employer retains the predecessor's employees, however, but otherwise completely
reorganizes the acquired company, including employee duties, he may argue that the retention of
the workers alone should not be sufficient to create successorship. Since the predecessor's contract
covered employees who were performing specific duties in a particular industrial structure, their
mere retention and presence at the new operation does not make the prior contract applicable to
or appropriate for the new operation.
73. A merger involves "the absorption of one corporation by another, which retains its name
and corporate identity with the added capital, franchises and powers of the merged corporation.
It is the uniting of two or more corporations by the transfer of property to one of them, which
continues in existence, the other being merged therein." 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041, at 9-10 (rev. ed. 1961). A consolidation is "a
combination by agreement between two or more corporations. . . by which their rights, franchises,
privileges and property are united, and become [those] of a single corporation. . . . [It] signifies
. . . the creation of a new corporation, and the termination of the existence of the old ones."
Id. § 7041, at 8-9.
74. A problem may arise for a union representing the employees of a company that merges
with or acquires another firm with workers that are represented either by another or by the same
union and that have higher wages and benefits than those of the acquiring company's workers.
The union representing the lower-paid men will then be under pressure to obtain immediately terms
comparable to those enjoyed by the other unit.
75. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
76. The employer might contend that he cannot determine who the majority representative
of his employees actually is and decline to recognize any or either union. Assuming he is not taking
steps to avoid successorship or unions, however, it is more likely that he will attempt to resolve
any doubt as to the majority status of the larger group's union by filing a petition with the Board
for clarification of the unit under § 9(b) of the LMRA. LMRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1965).
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by the contract of the larger unit.77
If the integrating units are relatively equal in size, different
considerations are involved. It has been held that upon the merger of
these units, represented by different unions, the representative status of
the respective unions is jeopardized. The employer, consequently, cannot
even be required to arbitrate grievances pursuant to one union's
contract, because section 9(a) of the LMRA 78 requires that he deal only
with his employees' majority representative. 79 In this situation, as well
as that in which only one of these units is organized, the representative
status of the unions is terminated, and they either must seek recognition
on the basis of signed authorization cards or obtain certification through
Board election processes. Once majority status is proved by one of the
unions, however, can it not demand, under Burns, that the employer
adhere to that union's pre-existing collective bargaining agreement
rather than negotiate a new contract? Under ordinary contract
principles, impossibility of performance only suspends contractual
obligations until the condition preventing fulfillment is dissipated." In
the labor situation, the condition preventing performance would be the
loss of representative status under law. Therefore, once the section 9(a)
requirement of majority status has been re-established, the obligations
of the pre-existing contract should resume for the new employer who,
under the Burns doctrine, "stands in the shoes of his predecessor." An
employer, however, might contend that ordinary contract principles do
not apply to collective bargaining agreements81 and that the
circumstances involved in regaining majority status create such a hiatus
that the applicability of the prior contract to the new situation is
precluded, particularly if a new Board certification is involved. Although
the arguments on both sides are persuasive, the Board should hold, if
confronted with this issue, that the pre-existing contract does not
resume; the surviving contract would not reflect the interests of a
substantial minority of employees and the stability of labor relations
would be seriously jeopardized.
77. Even if the integration of the units destroys the appropriateness of the larger group as
a collective bargaining unit and thereby excuses the employer from the existing contract (See notes
68 & 75 supra and accompanying text), the larger union will quickly be able to reestablish its
majority representative status through Board election procedures.
78. LMRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
79. Teamsters Local 568 v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967).
80. P. CONWAY, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 733-66 (3d ed. 1968); 6 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 1320-33 (1962).
8 1. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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V. A SHORT CONCLUSION
The law governing the obligations of successor employers under
pre-existing labor contracts today has reached a state in which it is
impossible to predict accurately the effects on labor relations wrought
by changes in business ownership. The Board has taken the position
that the continuation of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement
is the best way to accommodate the competing labor policies. The Tenth
Circuit8 2 has agreed, and the Ninth Circuit 83 has come to essentially the
same conclusion, but the Second Circuit84 considers this prohibited
government intervention into the area of collective bargaining.
Litigation undoubtedly will continue in this area either as the result of
attempting to avoid designation as a successor or as tests of the Burns
doctrine's application to mergers and consolidations. Action by the
Supreme Court, affirming the Board's decision, would not end all the
peripheral litigation, but would add a welcome and significant certainty
to this area of labor relations.
82. Ranch-Way, Inc. v. NLRB 77 L.R.R.M. 2689 (10th Cir. June 24, 1971).
83. Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
84. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
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